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I. INTRODUCTION
"The fiction is like a scaffolding in that it can be removed with ease."1
Pursuant to the federal estate and gift tax unlimited marital de-
duction, married individuals can transfer property to each other tax-
free during life or at death.2 The marital deduction is based on the
theory that a married couple is a single taxpaying unit and that trans-
fers within this unit should be disregarded. 3 As a general rule, a
transfer of property will only qualify for the marital deduction if it
grants the surviving spouse (or donee spouse4 ) outright ownership or
an equivalent thereof ("Terminable Interest Rule"). 5 This ensures
that the transferred property will be included in the surviving
spouse's transfer tax base. Transfer taxes will be deferred but not
escaped.6
An exception to the Terminable Interest Rule allows a donor
spouse to receive the marital deduction for the full value of property in
which he7 grants a surviving spouse nothing more than an income in-
terest if the property meets the requirements of qualified terminable
interest property ("QTIP Property"),s set forth in section 2056(b)(7) of
the Internal Revenue Code ("Code"). The donor spouse then receives
1. See L. L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 513, 529 (1931) [hereinafter
Fuller, Fictions I1].
2. See I.R.C. § 2056(a) (2005); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(a)-l(a) (as amended in 1994).
3. See S. REP. No. 97-114, at 127 (1981) ("[A] husband and wife should be treated as
one economic unit for purposes of estate and gift taxes.").
4. This Article refers throughout to the "surviving spouse" because it primarily ad-
dresses testamentary dispositions of QTIP Property. Unless otherwise indicated,
its conclusions are equally applicable to donee spouses who receive qualifying
income interests from inter vivos dispositions of QTIP Property.
5. See I.R.C. § 2056(b); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-1(c) (as amended in 1994). For a
general discussion of dispositions that qualify for the federal estate and gift tax
marital deduction, see Wendy C. Gerzog, Estate of Clack: Adding Insult to Injury,
or More Problems with the QTIP Tax Provisions, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 221, 223 (1996) [hereinafter Gerzog, Adding Insult to Injury].
6. See Estate of Letts v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 290, 295 (1997) ("It is a basic policy of the
marital deduction that property that passes untaxed from a predeceasing spouse
to a surviving spouse is included in the estate of the surviving spouse.").
7. This Article follows the general trend in scholarship on QTIP Property and refers
to the donor spouse as "he" and the surviving spouse as "she" because males are
statistically richer but have shorter life spans. See Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist
Perspective on the QTIP Trust and the Unlimited Marital Deduction, 76 N.C. L.
REV. 1729, 1729 n.3 (1998); Mary Louise Fellows, Wills and Trusts: "The King-
dom of the Fathers," 10 LAw & INEQ. 137, 157 n.81 (1991); Wendy C. Gerzog, The
Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA
WoMEN's L.J. 301, 305 n.ll (1995) [hereinafter Gerzog, Illogical and Degrading];
Wendy C. Gerzog, The Illogical and Sexist QTIP Provisions: I Just Can't Say it
Ain't So, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1605 (1998) [hereinafter Gerzog, Illogical and
Sexist].
8. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(i); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7 (as amended in 1994).
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the marital deduction without surrendering control over the ultimate
disposition of the property. 9
Since the enactment in 1981 of the provisions of the Code that cre-
ated this exception ("QTIP Provisions"),1 0 many articles have ana-
lyzed and critiqued the requirements for qualification for the initial
marital deduction.11 Far fewer have addressed the subsequent taxa-
tion of QTIP Property in the hands of the surviving spouse. 12 This
second component of the QTIP Provisions, arguably more significant
because it justifies the first, is the subject of this Article.
The taxation of QTIP Property can occur at three different points
in time: at the surviving spouse's death;13 at the surviving spouse's
lifetime disposition of her income interest;14 and at a remainderman's
disposition of a QTIP remainder interest. 15 The first two situations
are addressed by sections 2044 and 2519 of the Code ("QTIP Taxing
Provisions"), respectively. The third is addressed by various rulings
("QTIP Rulings")16 of the Internal Revenue Service ("Service").
This Article evaluates the QTIP Taxing Provisions and the QTIP
Rulings. Part II explains that in doing so, it relies on the theory of
legal fictions. This theory provides a conceptual tool by which to un-
derstand all aspects of the QTIP Provisions. Part III provides back-
ground for the analysis that follows by reviewing the marital
deduction provisions, the Terminable Interest Rule, and the QTIP
Provisions. Part IV demonstrates that the decision to grant the mari-
tal deduction for QTIP Property can be explained by means of a legal
fiction that treats QTIP Property as passing in its entirety to the sur-
viving spouse ("Ownership Fiction"). The Ownership Fiction ensures
that the QTIP Property will ultimately be taxed in the surviving
spouse's transfer tax base. This taxation is the topic of Parts V and
9. See I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(7), 2523(f).
10. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(a)(1)(A), 95 Stat.
172, 301 (1981).
11. See Dodge, supra note 7, at 1729 n.3; Gerzog, Adding Insult to Injury, supra note
5, at 223; Gerzog, Illogical and Degrading, supra note 7, at 305 n.11; Wendy C.
Gerzog, Solutions to the Sexist QTIP Provisions, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 97
(2000) [hereinafter Gerzog, Sexist QTIP Provisions]; Gerzog, Illogical and Sexist,
supra note 7, at 1605; Jay A. Soled, Dena L. Wolf & Nathan E. Arnell, Funding
Marital Trusts: Mistakes and their Consequences, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
89 (1996); Jerome M. Strauss & Daniel S. Corsaro, 'Perfecting' a QTIP Election:
Old Problem, New Cure, 35 RES GESTAE 484 (1992); Nancy Trethewey, Trust As-
sets were QTIP Despite Limit on Spouse's Right to Stub Income: Estate of Shelfer
v. Commissioner, 50 TAX L. 459 (1997).
12. The Author is unaware of any law review articles that specifically address the
taxation of QTIP Property.
13. See I.R.C. § 2044; Treas. Reg. § 20.2044-1(a) (as amended in 1998).
14. See I.R.C. § 2519; Treas. Reg. § 25.2519-1(a) (as amended in 2003).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 198-223.
16. See Rev. Rul. 98-8, 1998-1 C.B. 541; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 99-08-033 (Nov. 30,
1998); see also infra text accompanying notes 198-223.
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VI, which address the QTIP Taxing Provisions and the QTIP Rulings,
respectively. This Article concludes that the QTIP Taxing Provisions
lead to equitable results when applied by their terms, but inequitable
and inconsistent results when extended beyond their terms by the
QTIP Rulings.
II. LEGAL FICTIONS
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, legal fictions were
the topic of great interest to academics. Prominent writers such as
Bentham, Blackstone, Maine, and Fuller debated the question of
whether fictions had a role in the law and, if so, the nature of that
role. 17 Today, legal fictions are widespread throughout all areas of
law, but they receive little attention from academics.18 One recent
commentator remarked,
The legal fiction used to be a hot topic on the jurisprudential agenda. It was
written and talked about passionately by those who wrote and talked about
such things in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Then interest in
the subject withered and died, and virtually fell off the vine. 1 9
The same commentator posed the following logical question: "Why
would anyone want to write, or read for that matter, an article about a
formerly hot topic?" 20 The answer is that a discussion of legal fictions
is necessary to a thorough discussion of the QTIP Provisions. The
Ownership Fiction provides the theoretical basis for granting the mar-
ital deduction at the death of the first spouse to die21 and for taxing
the QTIP Property at a later point in time. 22 Understanding legal fic-
tions in general, and the Ownership Fiction in particular, is therefore
critical to understanding and justifying the taxation of QTIP Property.
In using the theory of legal fictions to examine and critique current
law regarding QTIP Property, this Article does not seek to revive the
debate over the merits of legal fictions or over their proper definition.
It assumes that legal fictions are an inescapable part of the law and
takes as its starting point the definition of a legal fiction set forth by
Lon L. Fuller, whose 1930 and 1931 articles on legal fictions are still
relied upon as the most comprehensive discussion on the topic to
17. See Louise Harmon, Falling off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Sub-
stituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1 (1990); Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous
Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2003); Tejshree
Thapa, Expounding the Constitution: Legal Fictions and the Ninth Amendment,
78 CORNELL L. REV. 139 (1992).
18. See Harmon, supra note 17, at 1; Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA.
L. REV. 871, 874 (1986).
19. Harmon, supra note 17, at 1.
20. Id.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 132-41.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 132-41.
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date. 23 The remainder of this Part reviews Fuller's thoughts on (i) the
elements of a legal fiction and (ii) the potential dangers of a legal
fiction.24
A. The Elements of a Legal Fiction
A legal fiction is a conceptual tool, a "device of legal thought and
expression" that places a new legal result into a pre-existing concep-
tual structure. 25 In so doing, it explains and justifies the result.
Fuller compares a legal fiction to scaffolding, in that it supports a
given legal result but can be "removed with ease" when need be.26
A legal fiction is an apparent falsehood, but it is neither a lie nor
an erroneous conclusion. 27 Fuller distinguishes a legal fiction from a
lie in that a fiction is not intended to deceive,28 and from an erroneous
conclusion in that a fiction is adopted with knowledge of its falsity.29
The author of the legal fiction "either positively disbelieves it, or is
partially conscious of its untruth or inadequacy."30
An author uses a legal fiction precisely because of its falsity, which
counterintuitively serves as "a metaphorical way of expressing a
truth."31 The fiction's underlying analogy re-characterizes the form of
a given situation to express what is perceived to be its substantive
reality. For example, "the doctrine of constructive receipt is based on
the [analogy] that once a taxpayer has an unrestricted right to a sum
of money that has actually been set aside for her," though not yet de-
livered to the taxpayer, "the situation is more akin to the taxpayer's
having possession of the money" than it is to not having possession of
the money. 32 The doctrine's falsity, that a taxpayer is in possession of
money that she has not yet received, is thought to represent the eco-
nomic reality of the situation.33
This re-characterization brings a new situation within, or excludes
a new situation from, the scope of an existing rule.34 And this process
23. See L. L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363 (1930) [hereinafter Fuller,
Fictions I]; Fuller, Fictions II, supra note 1; L. L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L.
REV. 877 (1931) [hereinafter Fuller, Fictions III).
24. As summarized from Fuller's three articles entitled Legal Fictions, which com-
prehensively cover the theory of legal fictions. See Fuller, Fictions I, supra note
23; Fuller, Fictions II, supra note 1; Fuller, Fictions III, supra note 23.
25. Fuller, Fictions II, supra note 1, at 513.
26. Id. at 529.
27. See Fuller, Fictions I, supra note 23, at 367-68.
28. See id. at 367.
29. See id. at 368.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 370.
32. John A. Miller, Liars Should Have Good Memories: Legal Fictions and the Tax
Code, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 6 (1993).
33. See id.
34. See Fuller, Fictions II, supra note 1, at 516.
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of inclusion or exclusion, in turn, justifies a legal result that would
otherwise seem incorrect or unfair. 35 The doctrine of constructive re-
ceipt brings sums of money set aside for, though not yet delivered to, a
taxpayer within the scope of pre-existing tax laws that operate on
money received by taxpayers. 36 Initially, it appears unfair to tax an
individual on sums of money that she has not yet received. It appears
more acceptable, however, when the situation is likened to actual re-
ceipt and the individual is characterized as being in the same eco-
nomic situation as if she had received it.37 Fuller explains that "[i]f
we can create the impression of a similarity (in fact and not simply in
legal effect).., we will have established.., a kind of vicarious persua-
sive force" 38 that will "induce conviction that a given legal result is
just and proper."39
Through this process of comparison and justification, a legal fiction
is able to reconcile a given legal result with pre-existing laws and
premises that the result would otherwise contradict.40 The doctrine of
constructive receipt reconciles the legal result of taxing an individual
on money not yet in her possession with the general principle that
money is only taxed when received.4 1 As discussed below, the Owner-
ship Fiction reconciles the decision to grant the marital deduction for
QTIP Property with the Terminable Interest Rule. Fuller identifies
this as the primary utility of a legal fiction: "to reconcile a specific
legal result with some premise or postulate."42
B. The Dangers of a Legal Fiction
The flipside of a legal fiction's utility is its potential danger. Fuller
warns that "[a] fiction taken seriously, i.e., 'believed,' becomes danger-
ous and loses its utility"43 and that "[a] fiction becomes wholly safe
only when it is used with a complete consciousness of its falsity."44
Fuller explains that to avoid the danger to which he refers, the "fiction
must drop out of the final reckoning."45
In the most general terms, "dropping the fiction" involves acknowl-
edging the falsity of a legal fiction and refraining from using the fic-
tion where it does not serve as a "metaphorical way of expressing a
35. See id. at 514.
36. See Miller, supra note 32, at 6
37. See id.
38. Fuller, Fictions I, supra note 23, at 381.
39. Fuller, Fictions II, supra note 1, at 517.
40. Id. at 514.
41. See Miller, supra note 32, at 6.
42. Fuller, Fictions H, supra note 1, at 514.
43. Fuller, Fictions I, supra note 23, at 370.
44. Id.
45. See Fuller, Fictions III, supra note 23, at 895.
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truth."46 Fuller explains that a fiction can sometimes be dropped sim-
ply by acknowledging that certain of its meanings are inappropriate
for the case at hand.47 With respect to the legal fiction that treats a
corporation as a person,48 the fiction can be dropped "by extracting
from the word 'person' (when it is applied to corporations) all those
qualities and attributes not legally appropriate to the corporation."49
No one would argue that a corporation has the legal right to bequeath
property by will, so this aspect of a person's legal rights is extracted
from the word "person" when applied to corporations.
Sometimes a fiction must be dropped in its entirety to avoid unjust
or incorrect results. For example, when a corporation acts as an alter
ego of its shareholders, the fiction that the corporation is an indepen-
dent person is dropped in its entirety.DO This allows a plaintiff to
"pierce the corporate veil" and sue the corporation's shareholders. If
the fiction were not dropped, the shareholders would be able to hide
behind it to advance their private interests.5 1
To understand when a legal fiction can be relied upon and when it
must be dropped, the "scaffolding" of the legal fiction must be removed
from the legal result that it facilitates. This will reveal the nature of
the fiction's role. Where a fiction serves as a metaphor for a truth, it
can and should be relied upon to facilitate equitable results. Where it
has no ability to express a truth, however, it must be dropped to avoid
unjust and unfair results. Before Parts IV through VI remove the
"scaffolding" of the Ownership Fiction from the taxation of QTIP Prop-
erty, Part III reviews the marital deduction provisions, the Termina-
ble Interest Rule, and the QTIP Provisions.
III. THE MARITAL DEDUCTION, THE TERMINABLE
INTEREST RULE, AND THE QTIP PROVISIONS
The marital deduction52 and the QTIP Provisions, 53 enacted pur-
suant to the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,54 represented a fun-
damental change in the taxation of transfers between spouses.5 5 This
46. Fuller, Fictions I, supra note 23, at 370.
47. See Fuller, Fictions III, supra note 23, at 896.
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S.
703, 713 (1934).
51. See id.
52. See I.R.C. § 2056(a) (2005); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(a)-l(a) (as amended in 1994).
53. See I.R.C. §§ 2044, 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(II); Treas. Reg. § 20.2044-1(a) (as amended in
1998); see also I.R.C. § 2519; Treas. Reg. § 25.2519-1(a) (as amended in 2003).
54. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(a)(1)(A), 95 Stat.
172, 301 (1981).




Part provides a brief history of the marital deduction followed by an
analysis of current law regarding the marital deduction, the Termina-
ble Interest Rule, and the QTIP Provisions. In so doing, this Part sets
the stage for the discussion of the Ownership Fiction that begins in
Part IV.
A. The Marital Deduction
Prior to 1948, when the first formulation of the federal estate tax
marital deduction was enacted,56 married couples in community prop-
erty states received estate tax benefits that were unavailable to mar-
ried couples in common law states. 57 In community property states,
one-half of a married couple's community property was deemed to be
owned by the first spouse to die while the other half was deemed to be
owned by the survivor.58 As a result, at the death of the first spouse
to die, regardless of which spouse that was, only one-half of the
couple's community property passing to the surviving spouse was sub-
ject to estate taxes.5 9 In common law states, in contrast, all property
passing to a surviving spouse was subject to estate taxes at the death
of the first spouse to die.60 Married couples in community property
states could therefore defer estate taxes on one-half of their property
until the death of the second spouse to die while married couples in
common law states could not.6 1
The Revenue Act of 1942 ("1942 Act")62 addressed this inequality
by defining a decedent's gross estate to include all community prop-
erty owned by the decedent and the decedent's surviving spouse.6 3
This provision, which denied married couples in community property
states the previously enjoyed benefits of tax deferral,64 proved highly
56. See Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, § 361, 62 Stat. 110, 117-21 (1948).
57. See RicHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFr TAXATION T 5.06[1],
at 5-102 (8th ed. 2005); Howard E. Abrams, A Reevaluation of the Terminable
Interest Rule, 39 TAx L. REV. 1, 3 (1983); Willard H. Pedrick, The Revenue Act of
1948: Income, Estate and Gift Taxes-Divided They Fall, 43 ILL. L. REV. 277,
293-94 (1948).
58. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 57, T 5.06[101, at 5-184; Abrams, supra note 57,
at 3; Pedrick, supra note 57, at 293-94.
59. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 57, 1 5.06110], at 5-184; Pedrick, supra note 57,
at 293-94; Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act
of 1948, 61 HAav. L. REV. 1097, 1125-26 (1948).
60. See Abrams, supra note 57, at 3.
61. See id.
62. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 402(b), 56 Stat. 798, 942 (1942)
(amending I.R.C. § 811(e)), repealed by Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471,





unpopular.6 5 It was repealed by the Revenue Act of 1948 ("1948
Act"), 6 6 and was replaced by the first formulation of the estate tax
marital deduction, which allowed a deduction for one-half of a dece-
dent's non-community property assets that passed to a surviving
spouse.6 7 The 1948 Act took the opposite approach from the 1942 Act
in achieving the goal of providing equal treatment to couples residing
in all states.68 Rather than denying the favorable pre-1942 commu-
nity property treatment to married couples in community property
states, it granted such treatment to married couples in common law
states.69 As a result, couples in common law states could defer taxes
on one-half of the property passing to a surviving spouse by virtue of
the marital deduction, just as couples in community property states
could do by virtue of the community property laws. The 1948 Act also
introduced new income tax provisions, allowing a married couple to
split their incomes between husband and wife by filing a joint income
tax return.70 In effect, these provisions treated married couples as
single taxpaying units for income tax purposes. Some commentators
advocated treating married couples the same way for estate tax pur-
poses, disregarding transfers between spouses and taxing property
only when it left the marital taxpaying unit.7 1 This theory of a mari-
tal unit, not adopted by the 1948 Act, would eventually become the
basis of the marital deduction. 72
The marital deduction remained unchanged until 1976, when Con-
gress (i) increased the deduction "to the greater of $250,000 or one-
half of the decedent's adjusted gross estate" and (ii) enacted a gift tax
component that allowed $100,000 of gifts and one-half of gifts in ex-
65. See Revenue Revisions, 1947-48: Hearings on Community Property and Family
Partnerships Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 80th Cong. 766-67 (1947)
(statement of J. Paul Jackson).
66. Revenue Act of 1948 § 351.
67. See id. § 361.
68. See Abrams, supra note 57, at 4-5.
69. See Reduction of Individual Income Taxes: Hearings on H.R. 4790 Before the S.
Comm. on Finance, 80th Cong. 24 (1948) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 4790]
(statement of John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury); id. at 311 (testimony of
Allan H. W. Higgins, Chairperson of the ABA Section of Taxation, Committee on
Equalization of Taxes in Community-Property and Common-Law States); Paul E.
Anderson, The Marital Deduction and Equalization Under the Federal Estate and
Gift Taxes Between Common Law and Community Property States, 54 MIcH. L.
REV. 1087, 1087 (1956); Surrey, supra note 59, at 1128.
70. See Hearings on H.R. 4790, supra note 69, at 310-11 (colloquy between Sen. Scott
Lucas and Allan H. W. Higgins, Chairperson of the ABA Section of Taxation,
Committee on Equalization of Taxes in Community-Property and Common-Law
States); STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 57, 5.06[1], at 5-102; Abrams, supra note
57, at 4-5.
71. See Abrams, supra note 57, at 10.
72. See id. at 12.
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cess of $200,000 to pass tax-free between spouses. 73 To ensure that
all married individuals would receive the same benefits from the in-
creased deduction,74 decedents in community property states were al-
lowed to deduct the greater of $250,000 or one-half of the value of
their estate calculated to include their spouse's share of community
property. 75 The stated intent of Congress with respect to these
changes was to allow married couples to transfer small or moderate
estates to each other free of federal estate taxes.7 6
Five years later, pursuant to the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 ("ERTA"),77 Congress eliminated the quantitative limits on both
the estate and gift tax marital deductions. 78 The unlimited estate tax
marital deduction is codified in section 2056(a);79 the unlimited gift
tax marital deduction is codified in section 2523(a).80 This Article ex-
clusively addresses the unlimited estate tax marital deduction, re-
ferred to hereinafter as the marital deduction.S1
ERTA shifted the focus of the estate and gift tax marital deduction
from treating all married couples alike to treating all married couples
as single taxpaying units, as originally proposed in 1948.82 The legis-
lative history reveals that in initiating this shift, Congress felt that it
was fair to treat a married couple's property as the couple themselves
73. S. REP. No. 94-938, pt. 2, at 14 (1976); see I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)(A) (1981), repealed
by Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(a)(1)(A), 95 Stat.
172, 301 (1981); see also STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 57, 5.06[5] [b], at 5-122 to -
127.
74. See Pedrick, supra note 57, at 303; Norman A. Sugarman, Estate and Gift Tax
Equalization-The Marital Deduction, 36 CAL. L. REv. 223, 225 (1948); Surrey,
supra note 59, at 1127-29.
75. See I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)(C), repealed by Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
§ 403(a)(1)(A); see also Abrams, supra note 57, at 11-12.
76. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, at 17 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-938, pt. 2, at 14.
77. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 § 403(a)(1)(A).
78. See id. § 403(d)(1); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 233-34 (Comm.
Print 1981) [hereinafter J. Comm. EXPLANATION OF ERTA].
79. See I.R.C. § 2056(a) (2005) ("For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the
value of the taxable estate shall, except as limited by subsection (b), be deter-
mined by deducting from the value of the gross estate an amount equal to the
value of any interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to
his surviving spouse, but only to the extent that such interest is included in de-
termining the value of the gross estate.").
80. See I.R.C. § 2523(a) (2004) ("Where a donor transfers during the calendar year by
gift an interest in property to a donee who at the time of the gift is the donor's
spouse, there shall be allowed as a deduction in computing taxable gifts for the
calendar year an amount with respect to such interest equal to its value.").
81. Unless otherwise specified, this Article's conclusions are equally applicable to the
unlimited gift tax marital deduction.




treat it: as "theirs," as opposed to "his" or "hers."8 3 The history states
that married couples commingle property during marriage and make
decisions with respect to such property jointly, treating it as belonging
to the unit rather than to either individual.8 4 As an additional justifi-
cation, Congress noted that an unlimited deduction would signifi-
cantly simplify the estate and gift taxes by eliminating the need to
determine which spouse's funds were used to acquire property held
within the marital unit.8 5
B. The Terminable Interest Rule
In establishing the unlimited marital deduction, section 2056(a) of
the Code is specifically limited by section 2056(b),86 which sets forth
the Terminable Interest Rule.8 7 The Terminable Interest Rule pro-
vides that property passing from a decedent spouse will not qualify for
the marital deduction if the surviving spouse's rights in such property
will terminate or fail upon "the lapse of time, or the occurrence of an
event or contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to
occur,"88 and if such termination or failure will allow some other per-
son to enjoy or possess the property in which the surviving spouse had
the interest.8 9
First enacted as part of the 1948 Act,90 the Terminable Interest
Rule ensures that transfer taxes on property passing between spouses
will be deferred but not escaped.91 As the Tax Court explained in
1954:
[T]he 'terminable interest' concept was devised for the purpose of assuring
that if the property bequeathed to the spouse was to be excluded from [the]
gross estate with respect to the decedent, it would be adequately integrated in
83. See H.R. REP. No. 97-201, pt. 1, at 159; see also Dodge, supra note 7, at 1743.
84. See H.R. REP. No. 97-201, pt. 1, at 159.
85. See J. COMM. EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 78, at 233-34.
86. See I.R.C. § 2056(a) (2005); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(a)-1(a) (as amended in 1994).
87. See I.R.C. § 2056(b); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(a)-2(a) (as amended in 1994).
88. I.R.C. § 2056(b).
89. See id. ("Where, on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event or contin-
gency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur, an interest passing to
the surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction shall be allowed under
this section with respect to such interest - (A) if an interest in such property
passes or has passed (for less than an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth) from the decedent to any person other than such surviving
spouse (or the estate of such spouse); and (B) if by reason of such passing such
person (or his heirs or assigns) may possess or enjoy any part of such property
after such termination or failure of the interest so passing to the surviving
spouse."); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-1(c) (as amended in 1994).
90. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, § 361, 62 Stat. 110, 117 (1948); see Sur-
rey, supra note 59, at 1125-26.
91. See Hearings on H.R. 4790, supra note 69, at 309 (testimony of Allan H. W. Hig-
gins, Chairperson of the ABA Section of Taxation, Committee on Equalization of
Taxes in Community-Property and Common-Law States).
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the spouse's estate so that on her death it would not escape the death tax a
second time.
9 2
Without the Terminable Interest Rule, an interest that qualified for
the marital deduction could terminate prior to or at the surviving
spouse's death, in which case it would not be included in either
spouse's estate.9 3 For example, if a decedent were allowed the marital
deduction for the bequest of an income interest to a surviving spouse
with the underlying property passing to his children at the surviving
spouse's death, the decedent's estate would be subject to estate tax
only on the value of the remainder interest passing to his children,
which could be substantially less than the total value of the prop-
erty.9 4 On the surviving spouse's death, her life interest would termi-
nate, nothing would be included in her estate, and a substantial
portion of the original property's value would have escaped transfer
taxes entirely. 95
Prior to 1981, the Terminable Interest Rule meant that transfers of
life estates, life income interests, and any other term interests that
could terminate prior to or at the surviving spouse's death would not
qualify for the marital deduction.96 Apart from outright dispositions,
the only transfers that qualified were those that granted the surviving
spouse a rough equivalent of full ownership rights9 7 such that the un-
derlying property would eventually be included in the surviving
spouse's estate.98 Examples include power of appointment trusts 99
and estate trusts. 10 0 A power of appointment trust grants the surviv-
ing spouse (i) all income from the trust payable annually or at more
frequent intervals and (ii) a power to appoint trust principal that is
exercisable at least in favor of the surviving spouse.10 1 This general
92. Estate of Pipe v. Comm'r, 23 T.C. 99, 104 (1954).
93. See Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-Value
Lines, 43 TAX L. REv. 241, 345 (1988); Gerzog, Adding Insult to Injury, supra note
5, at 223.
94. See Gerzog, Adding Insult to Injury, supra note 5, at 223.
95. See id.
96. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-l(g) exs. 1-5 (as amended in 1994); see also H.R.
REP. No. 97-201, pt. 1, at 159-60 (1981); Abrams, supra note 57, at 6.
97. In addition to those discussed in the text, examples include an outright bequest
conditioned on survival for a limited period of time, see I.R.C. § 2056(b)(3) (2005);
Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-3(a) (as amended in 1958), life insurance or annuity pay-
ments with a power of appointment in the surviving spouse, see I.R.C.
§ 2056(b)(6); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-6(a) (as amended in 1958), and certain in-
terests in qualified charitable remainder trusts, see I.R.C. § 2056(b)(8); Treas.
Reg. § 20.2056(b)-8(a) (as amended in 1994). For a general discussion of excep-
tions to the Terminable Interest Rule, see Gerzog, Adding Insult to Injury, supra
note 5, at 223.
98. See Gerzog, Adding Insult to Injury, supra note 5, at 223.
99. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(a) (as amended in 1994).
100. See Treas. Reg. 20.2056(c)-2(b)(1)(iii) (as amended in 2004).
101. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(a) (as amended in 1994).
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power of appointment ensures that the property will be included in
the surviving spouse's gross estate under section 2041.102 An estate
trust does not necessarily grant the surviving spouse an income inter-
est, but it provides by its terms that the remainder will pass to the
surviving spouse's estate at death.103
The legislative history to ERTA indicates that in contemplating an
unlimited marital deduction, Congress became concerned that the
Terminable Interest Rule would force a taxpayer to choose between
maximizing tax benefits and a particular disposition of assets.10 4 The
following comment from the legislative history explains this dilemma:
[T]he enactment of an unlimited marital deduction without any change being
made in the qualitative requirements for qualification would present an es-
tate owner with a difficult choice in many cases. All estate taxes could be
postponed, but only by giving the surviving spouse unrestricted control over
the property, which current law requires in order to obtain a deduction. The
owner may prefer not to give his or her spouse such control. The point be-
comes more significant as divorce and remarriage increase, which has oc-
curred. The property owner would like to be sure that upon the death of his
spouse his children by a prior marriage or marriages share in his property,
including the marital deduction property . . . for the substantial property
owner who must pay a tax if the marital dedication is not used the inability to
satisfy each of two objectives-postponing payment of tax and being able to
control the disposition of property-remains and the tax pull would be sub-
stantial to make maximum use of the deduction. A qualification test for mari-
tal deduction purposes which eliminates the general power of appointment
requirement would permit satisfaction of both objectives and provide more
flexibility in estate planning. 1 0 5
As a result of this concern, Congress enacted the QTIP Provisions at
the same time that it enacted the unlimited marital deduction. 10 6 The
QTIP Provisions create an exception to the Terminable Interest Rule
that allows a decedent to receive the marital deduction for the full
value of property in which he bequeaths his surviving spouse only a
life interest. 0 7
C. The QTIP Provisions
The QTIP Provisions consist of (i) section 2056(b)(7), which allows
the marital deduction for QTIP Property at the death of the first
102. See I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1).
103. See Treas. Reg. 20.2056(c)-2(b)(1)(iii) (as amended in 2004). Technically, estate
trusts do not implicate the terminable interest rule because they do not involve a
terminable interest. At the death of the surviving spouse, all principal and accu-
mulated income is distributed to the surviving spouse's estate such that no prop-
erty passes to a third party. See Jeffrey N. Pennell, Estates, Gifts and Trusts
Portfolios: Estate Tax Marital Deduction, 843-2nd TAX MGMT. (BNA) VL.E (2004).
104. See H.R. REP. No. 97-201, pt. 1, at 159-60 (1981); 127 CONG. REC. 17289 (1981).
105. 127 CONG. REC. 17289 (statement of Sen. Steve Symms); see also H.R. REP. No.
97-201, pt. 1, at 159-60.
106. See J. COMM. EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 78, at 233-34.
107. See Gerzog, Sexist QTIP Provisions, supra note 11, at 100-01.
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spouse to die, 0 8 and (ii) the QTIP Taxing Provisions (sections 2044
and 2519), which tax QTIP Property at the surviving spouse's death or
earlier disposition of her qualifying income interest.109 Section
2056(b)(7)(A) provides that QTIP Property is treated as passing to the
surviving spouse for purposes of receiving the marital deduction under
section 2056(a) and no part of such property is treated as passing to
any person other than the surviving spouse for purposes of being dis-
qualified from the marital deduction under section 2056(b)(1).11o
Thus, QTIP Property is treated as passing in its entirety to the surviv-
ing spouse for purposes of qualifying for the marital deduction and for
purposes of not being disqualified under the Terminable Interest
Rule."'
Section 2056(b)(7)(B) defines QTIP Property as property (i) that
passes from the decedent, (ii) in which the surviving spouse receives a
qualifying income interest for life, and (iii) for which an irrevocable
QTIP election is made.1 12 This definition involves three require-
ments. First, the property must pass from the decedent.113 This re-
quirement is interpreted broadly to include virtually any interest
acquired by the surviving spouse from the decedent spouse, be it by
will, intestate succession, dower, elective share, right of survivorship,
power of appointment, or life insurance beneficiary designation.114
Second, the surviving spouse must be given a qualifying income inter-
est for life,115 meaning that she is entitled to all income for life, paya-
ble annually or at more frequent intervals, 116 and that no person
(including the surviving spouse herself) has the power to appoint the
property during the surviving spouse's lifetime in favor of anyone
other than the surviving spouse. 117 The trustee may, but need not,
have powers to invade trust principal for the benefit of the surviving
spouse. 118
108. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(A) (2005); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7(a) (as amended in
2004).
109. See I.R.C. § 2044; Treas. Reg. § 20.2044-1(a) (as amended in 1998); see also I.R.C.
§ 2519; Treas. Reg. § 25.2519-1(a) (as amended in 2003). For a general overview
of the QTIP Provisions, see Pennell, supra note 103, at VI.F.
110. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(A); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7(a) (as amended in 2004).
111. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(A) ("In the case of qualified terminable interest property -
() for purposes of subsection (a), such property shall be treated as passing to the
surviving spouse, and (ii) for purposes of paragraph (1)(A), no part of such prop-
erty shall be treated as passing to any person other than the surviving spouse.");
see also H.R. REP. No. 97-201, pt. 1, at 161 (1981).
112. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(i); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7 (as amended in 2004).
113. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(i)(I).
114. See id. § 2056(c); Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(c)-1(a), -2(a) (as amended in 1994).
115. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(i)(II); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7(d) (as amended in
2004).
116. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(I).
117. See id. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(II).
118. See Pennell, supra note 103, at VI.F.2.d.
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As a final requirement, an irrevocable election must be made to
treat the property as QTIP Property.119 This election, made by the
decedent spouse's executor on an estate tax return (or, in the case of
an inter vivos QTIP trust, by the donor on a gift tax return),120 en-
sures that the property will be subject to transfer taxes under the
QTIP Taxing Provisions at the surviving spouse's death or earlier life-
time disposition of part or all of her qualifying income interest. 12 1 If
the surviving spouse dies holding the qualifying income interest, sec-
tion 2044 will apply, providing that the value of the surviving spouse's
gross estate includes the value of any property in which she had a
qualified income interest for life and for which a marital deduction
was allowed under section 2056(b)(7).122 If the surviving spouse dis-
poses of part or all of her qualifying income interest during her life,
section 2519 will apply, providing that any such disposition is treated
as a transfer of all interests in the QTIP Property other than the qual-
ifying income interest.123 As will be discussed in more detail in Part
VI,124 the QTIP Taxing Provisions have also been extended by the
Service, problematically, to a remainderman's transfer of a QTIP re-
mainder interest.125 By the terms of these provisions, however, they
apply only to a termination or transfer of the surviving spouse's quali-
fying income interest. 126
The QTIP Provisions appear to contradict the reasoning behind the
Terminable Interest Rule by granting a marital deduction for a termi-
nable interest. At the surviving spouse's death, her qualifying income
interest will terminate and the remainder will pass to the remainder-
man, a third party who will "possess and enjoy" the QTIP Property in
violation of the Terminable Interest Rule. 127 This apparent contradic-
tion cannot be explained by analogizing QTIP Property to either of the
exceptions mentioned above. 128 The surviving spouse is not given any
control over the ultimate disposition of the property, so it cannot be
compared to a power of appointment trust.129 The QTIP Property will
not pass to the surviving spouse's estate at her death, so it cannot be
compared with an estate trust.130 The apparent contradiction can,
119. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(i)(III); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7(b)(3), (b)(4) (as
amended in 2004).
120. See J. Comm. EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 78, at 233-34.
121. See id.
122. See I.R.C. § 2044; Treas. Reg. § 20.2044-1(a) (as amended in 1998).
123. See I.R.C. § 2519; Treas. Reg. § 25.2519-1(a) (as amended in 2003).
124. See infra text accompanying notes 198-248.
125. See Rev. Rul. 98-8, 1998-7 C.B. 24.
126. See I.R.C. §§ 2044, 2519.
127. See id. § 2056(b)(1)(B); Treas. Reg. § 20-2056(b)-1(c)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1994).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 99-103.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02.
130. See supra text accompanying note 103.
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however, be explained by means of the Ownership Fiction, as ex-
plained in Part IV.
V. THE OWNERSHIP FICTION
Fuller states that a legal fiction's primary utility lies in its ability
to reconcile a specific legal result with a pre-existing principle of
law. 13 1 The Ownership Fiction performs this function by reconciling
the decision to qualify QTIP Property for the marital deduction with
the Terminable Interest Rule. In so doing, it turns the QTIP Provi-
sions' apparent contradiction of this rule into a permissible exception.
This Part demonstrates how the Ownership Fiction's falsity leads to
this utility, while also creating the potential for misuse. This is a nec-
essary first step in "removing the scaffolding" of the Ownership Fic-
tion to understand its role in the taxation of QTIP Property.
A. The Ownership Fiction's Falsity and Utility
The Ownership Fiction is clearly a falsehood, treating a surviving
spouse as owning QTIP Property outright when she owns nothing
more than a life interest. But like all legal fictions, it is neither an
incorrect conclusion nor a lie. It is not an incorrect conclusion because
Congress was well aware that QTIP Property would not actually pass
to the surviving spouse. 13 2 Rather, its stated intent in enacting the
QTIP Provisions was to create an exception to the Terminable Interest
Rule for a situation where it would not pass to her.13 3 Additionally,
the Ownership Fiction is not a lie because Congress never intended for
anyone else to believe it. To the contrary, Congress sought to reassure
taxpayers that they would no longer have to choose between maximiz-
ing tax benefits and a certain disposition of assets.13 4
The Ownership Fiction's falsity is based on the analogy that the
ownership arrangement of QTIP Property is more similar to the sur-
viving spouse owning the property outright than it is to anyone else
owning any interest in it. This analogy expresses a truth regarding
the relationship between QTIP Property and the marital unit: that
estate taxes were deferred on the death of the first spouse to die such
that the property has not yet been treated as leaving the marital unit
for transfer tax purposes. Based on this truth, the analogy persua-
sively characterizes the QTIP Property as being owned by the surviv-
ing spouse, who is the sole representative of the unit after the death of
the first spouse to die.
131. See Fuller, Fictions II, supra note 1, at 514.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 104-06.
133. See H.R. REP. No. 97-201, pt. 1, at 159 (1981); 127 CONG. REC. 17289 (1981).
134. See H.R. REP. No. 97-201, pt. 1, at 159; 127 CONG. REC. 17289.
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The Ownership Fiction's persuasiveness is challenged by the pre-
mium that the gift and estate taxes place on the ownership right of
control.13 5 The gift and estate tax analysis of any given transaction
does not always coincide with a property law analysis, but the gift and
estate taxes rarely disregard the ownership right of control.136 The
presence or absence of this right generally determines the time and
extent of a gift under federal gift tax law, 137 and whether or not an
interest is included in a decedent's taxable estate under federal estate
tax law. 138 Here, the surviving spouse has no control over the QTIP
remainder interest but is still treated as owning all interests in the
QTIP Property for purposes of inclusion in her transfer tax base.
Viewed in terms of the marital unit, the Ownership Fiction remains
persuasive despite this challenge. Because one member of the unit
(the decedent spouse) exercises control over the QTIP Property, the
unit as a whole is deemed to exercise this ownership right. As dis-
cussed below, however, this deemed exercise of control has signifi-
cance only for purposes of inclusion in the surviving spouse's transfer
tax base.
The Ownership Fiction's analogy, false on its face yet capable of
expressing a truth, leads to its utility. By comparing QTIP Property
to property bequeathed outright to a surviving spouse, it allows the
Ownership Fiction to bring QTIP Property within the scope of tax
laws that operate on outright bequests. These laws (i) allow a marital
deduction for property passing to a surviving spouse 139 and (ii) subse-
quently include that property in the surviving spouse's transfer tax
base.140 Bringing QTIP Property within the scope of these laws justi-
fies the marital deduction by ensuring that transfer taxes will not be
escaped and that the danger contemplated by the Terminable Interest
Rule will not be encountered.
The utility just described is dependent upon the QTIP Taxing Pro-
visions sustaining the Ownership Fiction for purposes of, but only for
purposes of, balancing the initial marital deduction with a later tax. If
the QTIP Property is treated as owned by anyone else in this context,
it may escape transfer taxes and the Ownership Fiction will no longer
justify the initial deduction. If the QTIP Property is treated as owned
135. See Gerzog, Sexist QTIP Provisions, supra note 11, at 106-07.
136. See id.
137. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2 (as amended in 1999) ("As to any property, or part
thereof or interest therein, of which the donor has so parted with dominion and
control as to leave in him no power to change its disposition, whether for his own
benefit or for the benefit of another, the gift is complete.").
138. See I.R.C. §§ 2036-38, 2041(a)(2) (2005); see also Gerzog, Sexist QTIP Provisions,
supra note 11, at 106-07 ("Control is often the main characteristic of ownership
to determine ... inclusion in the decedent's estate.").
139. See I.R.C. § 2056(a); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(a)-l(a) (as amended in 1994).
140. See I.R.C. § 2033.
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by the surviving spouse in any other context, it will no longer express
a truth about the connection between QTIP Property and the marital
unit and will lead to the danger of which Fuller warns. 14 1
B. The Ownership Fiction's Potential Dangers
As with all legal fictions, the danger of the Ownership Fiction is
that it will facilitate unjust results.142 This danger will arise if the
Ownership Fiction is used in a situation in which it does not express a
fundamental truth regarding the connection between QTIP Property
and the marital unit. Two such situations involve the property law
and economic realities of QTIP Property.
Property law generally defines "ownership" as a collection of rights
that may be exercised with respect to property, including the rights to
possess, to use, to enjoy, to control, and to alienate such property.14 3
With respect to QTIP Property, these rights of ownership are split be-
tween the surviving spouse and one or more remaindermen. Gener-
ally, the surviving spouse is entitled to the income, use, and
enjoyment of the QTIP Property during her life, but has no rights with
respect to the QTIP remainder interest. The remainderman has no
current rights of possession, use, or enjoyment, but is entitled to the
remainder of the QTIP Property after the surviving spouse's qualify-
ing income interest has terminated.14 4 Therefore, the surviving
spouse's deemed ownership of the QTIP remainder interest has no
meaning with respect to the property law ownership of this interest.
Her deemed ownership of QTIP Property has no meaning for eco-
nomic purposes either. This lack of meaning was recognized by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Estate of Bonner v. United States.145
In Bonner, ownership interests in a piece of real property were divided
between a decedent and a QTIP trust for the decedent's lifetime bene-
fit.146 The decedent's executor used a forty-five percent fractional in-
terest discount in valuing the interests held outright separately from
those held by the trust, despite the fact that all such interests were
included in the decedent's estate (those held outright under section
2033147 and those held in the QTIP trust under section 2044). 148 The
court upheld the fractional interest discount because "[tihe [QTIP] as-
sets, although taxed as if they passed through [the decedent's] estate,
141. See supra text accompanying notes 43-51.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 43-51.
143. See 63C AM. JuR. 2D Property §§ 26-27 (2005); Kenneth Campbell, On the Gen-
eral Nature of Property Rights, 3 KING'S C. L. J. 79, 89-91 (1992).
144. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 780, 945, 1317-18 (8th ed. 2004).
145. 84 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1996).
146. See id. at 197.
147. I.R.C. § 2033 (2005).
148. See Bonner, 84 F.3d at 197.
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in fact were controlled at every step by [the decedent's spouse], which
a tax valuation with a fractional interest discount would reflect." 14 9
Thus, the court treated the decedent as owning the interests for pur-
poses of estate inclusion but not for purposes of valuation.
In Estate of Mellinger v. Commissioner,150 the Tax Court similarly
held that stock held outright by a surviving spouse and stock held for
her benefit in a QTIP trust should not be aggregated for valuation
purposes. 15 1 The court observed that the decedent did not, at any
time, possess, control, or have any power of disposition over the stock
in the QTIP trust. 5 2 Further, neither section 2044 nor the relevant
legislative history indicated that the decedent should be treated as the
owner for all purposes. "Section 2044 was designed to prevent QTIP
property from escaping taxation by including it in the estate of the
second spouse to die. There is, however, no indication that Section
2044 mandated identical tax consequences as an outright transfer to a
surviving spouse."15 3
In concluding that the surviving spouse should not be treated as
owning QTIP Property for valuation purposes, the courts in both cases
recognized that a surviving spouse's deemed ownership of QTIP Prop-
erty has no economic meaning. It has meaning only for purposes of
balancing the initial marital deduction with a subsequent transfer tax
before the QTIP Property leaves the marital unit. Using the Owner-
ship Fiction for any other purpose will lead to the fiction's danger: the
inequitable results of holding a surviving spouse responsible for own-
ership of property with respect to which she has no economic or prop-
erty law rights. The remainder of this Article analyzes the QTIP
Taxing Provisions and the QTIP Rulings to determine when this dan-
ger of the Ownership Fiction is avoided, as it was in Bonner and Mel-
linger, and when it becomes manifest.
V. THE QTIP TAXING PROVISIONS
The QTIP Taxing Provisions tax QTIP Property at the earlier to
occur of the surviving spouse's (i) death154 or (ii) lifetime disposition of
part or all of her qualifying income interest. 155 In both of these situa-
tions, the Ownership Fiction expresses the truth that for transfer tax
purposes, QTIP Property has not yet been treated as leaving the mari-
149. Id. at 199.
150. 112 T.C. 26 (1999); see also Bonner, 84 F.3d 196; Terry S. Jones, Estate of Bonner
v. United States: QTIPs and Fractional Interest Discounts: Whipsaw Wonder-
land, 33 IDAHo L. REV. 595 (1997).
151. See Mellinger, 112 T.C. at 37.
152. See id. at 36.
153. Id. at 37.
154. See I.R.C. § 2044 (2005); Treas. Reg. § 20.2044-1(a) (as amended in 1998).
155. See I.R.C. § 2519; Treas. Reg. § 25.2519-1(a) (as amended in 2003).
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tal unit. In both of these situations, the QTIP Taxing Provisions' re-
sponse is consistently based in the Ownership Fiction. In the first
situation, section 2044 includes the value of the QTIP Property in the
surviving spouse's estate,156 just as if she had owned it outright dur-
ing her life. In the second situation, section 2519 taxes the entire
QTIP remainder interest as soon as the surviving spouse disposes of
any portion of her qualifying income interest. 157 Initially, section
2519 does not appear to treat the surviving spouse as she would be
treated had she owned the QTIP Property outright, but a closer analy-
sis proves otherwise. In both cases, the QTIP Taxing Provisions pro-
duce equitable results.
A. Section 2044: Taxing QTIP Property at the Surviving
Spouse's Death
Section 2044 applies to the typical scenario involving QTIP Prop-
erty: a spouse bequeaths QTIP Property to his surviving spouse for
life and provides that at her death, the property will pass to his chil-
dren or other third party remainderman. Both the surviving spouse
and the children hold their respective QTIP interests until the surviv-
ing spouse's death, at which time section 2044 includes the value of
the QTIP Property in the surviving spouse's gross estate. 158 In so do-
ing, section 2044 treats the surviving spouse as if she had received
outright ownership of the underlying QTIP Property and held that
property for life. 159
For example, assume that pursuant to a decedent's will, QTIP
Property valued at $200,000 passes to a surviving spouse for life. The
surviving spouse holds her qualifying income interest until her death
ten years later when the value of the underlying property is $300,000.
This value ($300,000) will be included in her gross estate under sec-
tion 2044.160 To the extent not consumed during her life, the income
from such property, along with any principal distributions that she
receives, will be included in her gross estate as property that she owns
outright (under section 2033).161 This is the same result as if property
worth $200,000 had passed outright to the surviving spouse under the
decedent spouse's will. To the extent not consumed during life, the
property, along with any appreciation thereon and any income there-
from, would be included in her gross estate under section 2033.162
156. See I.R.C. § 2044.
157. See id. § 2519.
158. See id. § 2044; Treas. Reg. § 20.2044-1(a) (as amended in 1998).
159. See I.R.C. § 2033.
160. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2044-1(e) ex. 1 (as amended in 1998); H.R. REP. No. 97-201,
pt. 1, at 159 (1981).
161. See H.R. REP. No. 97-201, pt. 1, at 159.
162. I.R.C. § 2033.
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A surviving spouse's receipt of a qualifying income interest fol-
lowed by the remainderman's receipt of the QTIP remainder interest
at the surviving spouse's death is substantially the same, in effect, as
a surviving spouse's receipt of the underlying QTIP Property followed
by her bequest of such property to the remainderman. It is therefore
equitable to treat the two situations alike for purposes of balancing
the initial marital deduction with a later transfer tax. Section 2044
does just that, balancing the initial marital deduction, granted as if
the QTIP Property had passed outright to the surviving spouse, with
an estate tax, applied as if the property had so passed.
B. Section 2519: Taxing QTIP Property at the Earlier
Transfer of a Qualifying Income Interest
Section 2519 applies to a less typical scenario involving QTIP Prop-
erty, in which a surviving spouse transfers part or all of her qualifying
income interest during her life. Section 2519 provides that any such
disposition is deemed to be a transfer of all interests in the property
other than the income interest.16 3 The regulations and legislative his-
tory interpret the term "disposition" broadly to include any circum-
stance in which the surviving spouse's right to receive income is
relinquished or terminated, by whatever means.1 6 4 The surviving
spouse is also treated as making a gift under section 2511165 in the
amount of the transferred income interest, less any consideration re-
ceived in return.16 6
Initially, section 2519 does not appear to be based on the Owner-
ship Fiction. If a surviving spouse were treated as if she owned the
QTIP Property outright, one would expect that her disposition of a
portion of her qualifying income interest would have no bearing on the
QTIP remainder interest. At the very least, one would expect that her
qualifying income interest would be treated as a proxy for the underly-
ing property, such that her transfer of a portion of the qualifying in-
come interest would be deemed a transfer of a corresponding portion
of the underlying QTIP Property.
A closer analysis reveals that like section 2044, section 2519 treats
a surviving spouse just as she would be treated if she owned the QTIP
Property outright. The key to understanding this result is the special
163. See id. § 2519; Treas. Reg. § 25.2519-1(a) (as amended in 2003).
164. See H.R. REP. No. 97-201, pt. 1, at 161 (providing that property subject to a QTIP
election will be subject to transfer taxes at the earlier to occur of (i) the date on
which the spouse disposes (either by gift, sale or otherwise) of all or part of the
qualifying income interest, or (ii) upon the spouse's death).
165. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2519-1(a) (as amended in 2003).
166. See I.R.C. § 2511; Treas. Reg. § 25.2519-1(a) (as amended in 2003).
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valuation rule of section 2702.167 Designed to prevent taxpayers from
undervaluing gifts for gift tax purposes, 168 this rule provides that
when a donor makes a transfer in trust169 to or for the benefit of a
member of the donor's family,170 any interest?17 in the trust (other
than a qualified interest) 172 retained173 by the donor or an applicable
family member174 is valued at zero for purposes of determining the
amount of such gift.175 Since the value of the transferred interest is
determined by subtracting the value of the retained interest from the
value of the underlying property, this produces a correspondingly high
gift tax value for the transferred interest.17 6
As a result of section 2702's valuation rule, if a surviving spouse is
bequeathed property outright and subsequently transfers an income
interest therein to a family member, she will be treated as making a
transfer in trust while retaining an interest that is not a qualified in-
terest.17 7 Her retained interest will be valued at zero and the gift tax
167. I.R.C. § 2702(a). See Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-1 (as amended in 1998). For an over-
view of section 2702, see Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Estates, Gifts and Trusts Port-
folios: Partial Interests-GRATS, GRUTS, QPRTS (Section 2702), 836-1st TAX
MGMT. (BNA) 11 (2004); Paul Hood, Jr., Estates, Gifts and Trusts Portfolios: Valu-
ation, 830-2nd TAX MGMT. (BNA) IV (2005); Adena W. Testa, Estates, Gifts and
Trusts Portfolios: Chapter 14, 835-2nd TAx MGMT. (BNA) V (2004).
168. See Grayson M. P. McCouch, Rethinking Section 2702, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 99 (1994).
169. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-2(a)(2) (as amended in 1992) ("A transfer in trust in-
cludes a transfer to a new or existing trust and an assignment of an interest in an
existing trust.").
170. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1992) ("With respect to any indi-
vidual, member of the family means the individual's spouse, any ancestor or lin-
eal descendant of the individual or the individual's spouse, any brother or sister
of the individual, and any spouse of the foregoing.").
171. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-2(a)(4) (as amended in 1992) ("An interest in trust in-
cludes a power with respect to a trust if the existence of the power would cause
any portion of a transfer to be treated as an incomplete gift under chapter 12.").
172. See I.R.C. § 2702(b) (defining qualified interest as (i) the right to receive a fixed
amount payable at least annually (an annuity interest); (ii) the right to receive a
fixed percentage of the annual fair market value of the trust property at least
annually (a unitrust interest); or (iii) a noncontingent remainder if all of the other
interests are qualified annuity or unitrust interests); Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-
2(a)(5), (6), (7), (8) (as amended in 1992).
173. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1992) ("Retained means held by
the same individual both before and after the transfer in trust. In the case of the
creation of a term interest, any interest in the property held by the transferor
immediately after the transfer is treated as held both before and after the
transfer.")
174. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-1(a) (as amended in 1998) (defining applicable family
member as provided in Treasury Regulation Section 25.2701-1(d)(2): "an applica-
ble family member is, with respect to any transferor - (i) [t]he transferor's spouse;
(ii) [any ancestor of the transferor or the transferor's spouse; and (iii) [tihe
spouse of any such ancestor").
175. See I.R.C. § 2702(a); Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-1(a) (as amended in 1998).
176. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-1(b) (as amended in 1998).
177. See I.R.C. § 2702(a); Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-1 (as amended in 1998).
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value of the transferred interest will be the full value of the underly-
ing QTIP Property.178 Section 2519 leads to the same result. If a sur-
viving spouse transfers any part or all of her qualifying income
interest, she will be treated as making a gift of (i) all interests in the
property other than the income interest under section 2519 and (ii)
the transferred income interest under section 2511.179 If she trans-
fers only a part of her income interest, she will also be treated under
section 2702 as making a transfer in trust of a portion of her qualify-
ing income interest while retaining a portion that is not a qualified
interest.1 8 0 The retained portion will be valued at zero and the value
of the section 2511 gift will be the full value of the income interest.
The total gift will be the full value of the underlying QTIP Property,
just as if the surviving spouse had received the QTIP Property out-
right and subsequently gifted a partial interest. 18 1
An example illustrates that section 2519 treats QTIP Property ex-
actly as it would be treated if it were owned outright by the surviving
spouse. Assume that a surviving spouse holds a qualifying income in-
terest with an actuarial value of $100,000 in QTIP Property that has a
value of $300,000. Assume further that the surviving spouse makes a
gift of ten percent of her qualifying income interest. Under section
2519, she will be treated as making a gift of the value of the QTIP
Property less the actuarial value of her qualifying income interest
($300,000 - $100,000 = $200,000). Under section 2511, she also will be
treated as making a gift of the fair market value of the transferred
portion of her income interest (10% of $100,000 = $10,000).182 Under
section 2702, her ninety percent retained income interest will be val-
ued at zero, thereby increasing the value of her gift under section 2511
to $100,000.183 Her total gift will be $300,000, reduced by any consid-
eration that she receives in exchange.' 8 4 This is the same result as if
the surviving spouse received the QTIP Property outright and subse-
quently made a gift of ten percent of the income therefrom. Under
section 2702, the surviving spouse would be treated as making a
transfer in trust of an income interest that was not a qualified inter-
est, while retaining an interest. The retained interest would be val-
ued at zero and the value of the transferred interest would be the full
value of the underlying property ($300,000).185
178. See I.R.C. § 2702(a); Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-1 (as amended in 1998).
179. See I.R.C. § 2519; Treas. Reg. § 25.2519-1 (as amended in 2003).
180. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2519-1(g) exs. 4, 5 (as amended in 2003).
181. See supra text accompanying note 178.
182. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2519-1(g) ex. 1 (as amended in 2003).
183. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2519-1(a) (as amended in 2003); see also I.R.C. § 2702; Treas.
Reg. § 25.2519-1(g) ex. 4, 5 (as amended in 2003).
184. For the effect of receiving consideration and thereby reducing the value of the
section 2511 gift, see Treas. Reg. § 25.2519-1(g) ex. 2 (as amended in 2003).
185. See I.R.C. § 2702(a); Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-1 (as amended in 1998).
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There are two ways in which section 2519's treatment of QTIP
Property differs from section 2702's treatment of property held out-
right. First, section 2702 distinguishes between gifts to family mem-
bers and gifts to non-family members,' 8 6 while section 2519 does not.
Second, section 2702 allows a taxpayer to designate a portion of prop-
erty with respect to which a transfer will be made, in which case the
special valuation rules apply only to that portion. Section 2519 does
not.
With respect to the first distinction, section 2519 does not distin-
guish between family members and non-family members because, as a
practical matter, there is no need to. Generally, a surviving spouse's
transfer of a qualifying income interest will be as part of an estate
planning transaction to transfer wealth to lower generations within a
family.' 8 7 As a result, section 2519 will generally apply only to in-
trafamily transfers.
The second distinction exists in the legislative history, but not in
practice. Section 2702's history indicates that a donor can designate a
portion of a trust from which an income interest is transferred. Sec-
tion 2702 will then apply only to that percentage of the trust.I8 8
Neither the legislative history nor the regulations to section 2519 ex-
plicitly allow a surviving spouse to do the equivalent: designate a por-
tion of QTIP Property from which an interest will be transferred such
that section 2519 applies only to that portion. Several private letter
rulings have allowed this, however.18 9 Each of the rulings addresses
some variation on the same fact pattern,190 in which a surviving
spouse divides a trust holding QTIP Property into two or more sepa-
rate trusts and disposes of her qualifying income interest in one such
trust. The rulings hold that section 2519 applies only to the trust from
which the qualifying income interest is transferred. The portion of the
QTIP remainder interest treated as transferred is therefore propor-
tionate to the transferred portion of the income interest.191 The rul-
186. See I.R.C. § 2702(a); Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-1(a) (as amended in 1998).
187. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Lipoff, Revisiting Purchases of Remainder Interests in
QTIP Trusts, 27 EST. PLAN. 114 (2000) [hereinafter Lipoff, Remainder Interests];
Lawrence M. Lipoff, Estates and Trusts, Revenue Ruling 98-8: Purchases of QTIP
Remainder Interests, CPA J., July 1998, at 58.
188. The legislative history asserts that "for a transfer with respect to a specified por-
tion of property, Section 2702 applies only to such portion." J. Comm. ON TAXA-
TION, DESCRIPTION OF TAX PROVISIONS OF H.R. 1555 AND S. 750 (TITLE I OF THE
TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS ACT OF 1991), at 13-18 (Comm. Print 1991); see also
CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 11, 102nd Cong. 2nd Sess., pt. 16 (1992).
189. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-24-023 (Feb. 26, 2003); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
2003-19-002 (Jan. 13, 2003); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-50-033 (Sept. 10, 2002);
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-37-022 (June 13, 2001); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-44-
034 (Aug. 8, 2000); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 99-26-019 (Mar. 30, 1999).




ings further hold that section 2702 will not treat an interest in any
other separate trust as a retained interest in valuing the gift.192
Despite the two distinctions, section 2519, like section 2044, is con-
sistently based on the Ownership Fiction, treating a surviving spouse
just as she would be treated if she owned QTIP Property outright.
However, asserting that the QTIP Taxing Provisions are consistently
based on the Ownership Fiction does not mean that they blindly follow
the fiction in all situations. The legislative history193 provides the fol-
lowing example of a situation, involving an inter vivos transfer of
QTIP Property, in which the Ownership Fiction is dropped because it
no longer serves as a metaphor for a truth:
[W] here the donor-spouse retains an interest or power in the qualified termi-
nable interest property and the donor subsequently transfers the power or
interest prior to the deemed transfer by the donee-spouse under sections 2044
or 2519, the transfer might be subject to gift tax. Similarly, where the do-
nor-spouse retained an interest or power in the qualified terminable interest
property until his death, all or a portion of the qualified terminable interest
property might be includible in his gross estate. The donor-spouse or his es-
tate would be so taxable even though the qualified terminable interest prop-
erty also would be treated as transfer[red] ... under sections 2044 or 2519. In
order to preclude this result, the Congress intends that any retained interest
or power which the donor-spouse transfers, or dies owning, prior to a deemed
transfer by the donee-spouse under sections 2044 or 2519 should not be
treated as a gift or be included in the donee-spouse's gross estate.194
The truth usually expressed by the Ownership Fiction (that treating
the surviving spouse as owning QTIP Property will equitably balance
the earlier deduction with a subsequent tax) is entirely untrue in this
situation. To the contrary, treating the surviving spouse as owning
the QTIP Property would lead to the inequitable result of including
such property in the transfer tax bases of both spouses. To avoid this
result, the legislative history indicates that the Ownership Fiction will
be dropped. 19 5
This Part has demonstrated that the QTIP Taxing Provisions are
consistently based on the Ownership Fiction, treating a surviving
spouse just as she would be treated if she owned the QTIP Property
outright. But they do not blindly follow the fiction if doing so would
lead to inequitable results. Together, along with section 2056(b)(7),
they create an equitable taxing regime, taking advantage of the Own-
ership Fiction's utility while avoiding its dangers. A surviving spouse
is granted the benefits of outright ownership at the death of the first
spouse to die. She is later held responsible for the corresponding det-
riment of outright ownership, but for no further detriment.
192. See id.
193. J. COMM. EXPLANATION OF ERTA, supra note 78, at 231-40.




VI. THE QTIP RULINGS
Part V demonstrated that when applied by their terms, the QTIP
Taxing Provisions are consistently based in the Ownership Fiction.
Because they address situations in which the Ownership Fiction ex-
presses a truth regarding the connection between QTIP Property and
the marital unit, they lead to equitable results. This Part addresses a
situation in which the Ownership Fiction expresses no such truth and
to which the QTIP Taxing Provisions do not apply by their terms: the
disposition of a QTIP remainder interest. Through the QTIP Rulings,
the Service has treated this disposition inconsistently, relying upon
the Ownership Fiction where the transaction is structured as a
sale, 196 and dropping it where it is structured as a gift.19 7 The follow-
ing discussion of these rulings demonstrates how this has led to incon-
sistent and inequitable results.
A. Taxing QTIP Property at the Transfer of a Remainder
Interest
1. Sale of a QTIP Remainder Interest
In Revenue Ruling 98-8198 ("Rev. Rul. 98-8"), the Service ruled that
when a surviving spouse purchases a QTIP remainder interest from
the named remainderman for a promissory note in the amount of the
QTIP remainder interest, she makes a gift under section 2519 in the
amount of the value of the remainder interest.199 Under the facts of
the ruling, assets worth $X plus $Y passed under a decedent's will to a
QTIP trust for his surviving spouse's lifetime benefit with the remain-
der passing to his child on the spouse's death. The surviving spouse,
the child, and the trustee of the QTIP trust agreed to the following
arrangement: (i) the surviving spouse would purchase the child's
QTIP remainder interest for promissory notes in the face amount of
the actuarial value of the QTIP remainder interest ($X); (ii) the trus-
tee would distribute the QTIP assets (having a value of $X plus $Y) to
the surviving spouse; and (iii) the surviving spouse would pay $X to
the child in satisfaction of the promissory note. The surviving spouse
contended that the receipt of the QTIP remainder interest constituted
full and adequate consideration for the promissory note and that the
transfer did not constitute a gift. The Service disagreed.200
196. See Rev. Rul. 98-8, 1998-1 C.B. 541.
197. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 99-08-033 (Nov. 30, 1998).
198. See Rev. Rul. 98-8, 1998-1 C.B. 541. The issue presented in Rev. Rul. 98-8 was
first raised by a taxpayer and settled with the Service in Estate of Olsten, No.
22277-95, 1996 CTF 3-33 (Jan. 17, 1996). The Service issued Rev. Rul. 98-8 to
prevent similar transactions. For a general discussion and critique of Rev. Rul.
98-8, see Lipoff, Remainder Interests, supra note 187, at 115.




Under two different arguments, the Service concluded that the sur-
viving spouse made a taxable gift in the amount of the QTIP remain-
der interest.201 Under the first, the Service characterized the
transaction as a commutation of the surviving spouse's income inter-
est and argued that a commutation was a taxable disposition of the
surviving spouse's qualifying income interest, resulting in a gift under
section 2519 of the value of the QTIP remainder interest.20 2 A com-
mutation is a division of trust property between one or more life bene-
ficiaries and one or more remaindermen based on the proportionate
values of their interests.203 The Service claimed that this accurately
characterized the transaction at issue-a transaction which left the
surviving spouse with assets equaling the actuarial value of her quali-
fying income interest ($Y) and the child with assets equaling the actu-
arial value of the QTIP remainder interest ($X).
The Service then claimed that there was little distinction between
this commutation and the examples of sales and commutations in the
regulations and legislative history that are explicitly characterized as
dispositions.204 In all cases, the surviving spouse's interest in a QTIP
trust terminates, leaving her with outright ownership of an amount of
property equal to the actuarial value of her income interest. The Ser-
vice concluded that the surviving spouse should be treated just as she
was in the regulations and legislative history: as having made a dis-
position of her qualifying income interest under section 2519.205
Even if the transaction could not be characterized as a commuta-
tion, the Service argued that the surviving spouse had made a gift
under a second argument. Specifically, the surviving spouse had not
received fair and adequate consideration 2O6 for her transfer of the
promissory notes and had therefore made a gift in their face
amount.20 7 After noting that the surviving spouse had transferred a
valuable asset (the promissory notes) in exchange for an asset already
included in her transfer tax base under section 2044 (the QTIP re-
201. For more comprehensive treatment of each argument, see I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv.
1996 WL 33320998 (Apr. 24, 1996).
202. See Rev. Rul. 98-8, 1998-1 C.B. 541.
203. Id.; see also Estate of Novotny v. Comm'r, 93 T.C. 12 (1989) (indicating that com-
mutation by surviving spouse and remainderman constituted a disposition by
spouse of income interest for the purposes of section 2519).
204. See Rev. Rul. 98-8, 1998-1 C.B. 541 ('[Treas. Reg.] § 25.2519-1(g), Example (2)
(illustrating that the sale by the spouse of the spouse's income interest to the
trust remaindermen is a disposition of the income interest); § 25.2519-1(f) provid-
ing that '[T]he sale of qualified terminable interest property, followed by the pay-
ment to the donee-spouse of a portion of the proceeds equal to the value of the
donee-spouse's income interest, is considered a disposition of the qualifying in-
come interest.'").
205. See id.
206. See I.R.C. § 2512(b) (2005); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (as amended in 1992).
207. See Rev. Rul. 98-8, 1998-1 C.B. 541.
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mainder interest), the Service concluded that "receipt of an asset that
does not effectively increase the value of the recipient's [potential]
gross estate does not constitute adequate consideration for purposes of
the gift and estate tax."2 0 8
The Service supported this argument with Commissioner v.
Wemyss, 20 9 a 1945 case holding that the "[t]he section taxing as gifts
transfers that are not made for 'adequate and full [money] considera-
tion' aims to reach those transfers which are withdrawn from the do-
nor's estate."2 1o The Service cited two other 1940s cases2 1 1 for the
proposition that a husband's transfer of property to his fianc6e in ex-
change for her relinquishment of marital rights is not made for ade-
quate and full consideration because the assets subject to marital
rights are already included in his taxable estate. 2 12 The Service
stated that the case at hand was analogous since the surviving spouse
had transferred property to the child in exchange for something that
had no effect on the value of her gross estate.2 13 The ruling concludes
by stating that the result under either argument would be the same
had the spouse transferred cash rather than promissory notes.
2. Gift of a QTIP Remainder Interest
In Private Letter Ruling 99-08-033214 ("PLR '033"), a taxpayer re-
sponded to Rev. Rul. 98-8 by arguing that if the sale of a QTIP remain-
der interest to a surviving spouse for its fair market value constitutes
a gift from the surviving spouse in the amount of that value, no gift
tax should be due if the transaction is altered so that the surviving
spouse does not transfer value to the remainderman. In other words,
a remainderman's gratuitous transfer of a QTIP remainder interest to
a surviving spouse should not constitute a gift because, pursuant to
the reasoning of Rev. Rul. 98-8, the QTIP remainder interest is either
accorded a value of zero when received by the surviving spouse or is
treated as already owned by the surviving spouse. The Service re-
jected this rationale. 2 15
Under the facts of PLR '033, a surviving spouse held a qualifying
income interest in a QTIP trust established by her decedent spouse.
At her death, trust principal was to pass to a remainder trust for the
benefit of the children of the decedent spouse and surviving spouse.
208. Id.
209. 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
210. Id. at 307 (second alteration in original).
211. See Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945); Comm'r v. Bristol, 121 F.2d 129 (1941).
212. See Merrill, 324 U.S. at 311-12; Bristol, 121 F.2d at 136; Rev. Rul. 98-8, 1998-1
C.B. 541.
213. See Rev. Rul. 98-8, 1998-1 C.B. 541.




The children, the surviving spouse, and the trustees of both the QTIP
trust and the remainder trust proposed to terminate the QTIP trust
and distribute the trust corpus to the surviving spouse.2 16 The tax-
payer (one of the children) requested a ruling that, pursuant to the
reasoning of Rev. Rul. 98-8, the transfer of the QTIP remainder inter-
est to the surviving spouse would not be subject to gift tax.2 17
In rejecting this request and concluding that the proposed transac-
tion would constitute a taxable gift, the Service stated that the conclu-
sion of Rev. Rul. 98-8 (that receipt of the QTIP remainder interest by
the surviving spouse would not increase the value of her potential tax-
able estate) was not pertinent to the federal gift tax consequences of
the proposed transfer. 2 18 The Service explained:
Rev. Rul 98-8 focuses on what constitutes adequate consideration for transfer
tax purposes and concludes that the receipt of the remainder interest by the
Spouse does not constitute adequate consideration for the spouse's transfer to
the remainderman. It does not follow that the remainder interest should be
valued at zero (or the transfer of the interest should not constitute a gift)
when the remainderman (Taxpayer) transfers the interest to the Spouse and
receives no consideration in exchange.
2 1 9
The Service concluded that the taxpayer would be transferring a valu-
able property interest to the spouse and receiving nothing in return,
thereby depleting his potential gross estate and making a taxable gift
under section 2512(b).220 Again without explanation or support, the
Service asserted that if the proposed transfer were to a third party
rather than to the surviving spouse, it would "clearly be a gift." The
Service concluded, "[tihe result is the same if the donee is the surviv-
ing spouse."2 21
The result of PLR '033 cannot be reconciled with the result of Rev.
Rul. 98-8.222 If, pursuant to Rev. Rul. 98-8, the sale of a QTIP remain-
der interest to a surviving spouse for its fair market value constitutes
a gift from the surviving spouse in the amount of that value, there
should be no gift if the transaction is altered so that the surviving
spouse does not transfer any value to the remainderman. If, pursuant
to PLR '033, the gift of a QTIP remainder interest to a surviving
spouse constitutes a gift from the remainderman in the amount of its
fair market value, there should be no gift if the transaction is altered
so that the surviving spouse transfers that value in exchange.
216. See id. The proposal involved petitioning the local probate court under a state
statute that permitted the termination of a trust when, "owing to circumstances
unforeseen by the settlor, the continuation of the trust would impair or defeat the






222. See Lipoff, Remainder Interests, supra note 187, at 119.
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Instead, these rulings treat the QTIP remainder interest as having
different owners depending on whether the transaction is structured
as a gift or a sale. As a result, it is impossible to structure the transfer
such that it is not a gift in the amount of the QTIP remainder interest
by either the surviving spouse or the remainderman. PLR '033 offers
no explanation for this result beyond its statement that the result of
Rev. Rul. 98-8 is irrelevant to the transaction at issue. 22 3
B. Dropping the Ownership Fiction
These conflicting rulings can be explained by means of the Owner-
ship Fiction's danger. As discussed in Part IV,224 this danger is en-
countered when the Ownership Fiction is used in situations in which
it has no utility as a "metaphorical way of expressing a truth."2 2 5 The
QTIP Rulings address such situations, since they both deal with the
economic and property law realities of QTIP ownership. The Owner-
ship Fiction's lack of meaning in these situations becomes apparent as
soon as the remainderman disposes of the QTIP remainder interest,
exercising a right of actual ownership that directly contradicts the
surviving spouse's deemed ownership. 226 PLR '033 acknowledges this
lack of meaning and drops the fiction. Rev. Rul. 98-8, in contrast, fails
to drop the fiction and proceeds on the assumption that the surviving
spouse actually owns the QTIP Property. This leads to the conflicting
results of the two rulings.
Returning to Rev. Rul. 98-8 in light of the Ownership Fiction's fal-
sity reveals that both of its arguments ignore the significant change in
the surviving spouse's economic and property law rights when she re-
ceived actual ownership of the QTIP remainder interest. In ignoring
this change, they lead to incorrect conclusions. Under the first argu-
ment, the Service characterized the transaction as a commutation of
the surviving spouse's qualifying income interest and compared it to
the sales and commutations characterized as taxable dispositions in
the regulations. 22 7 The examples to which Rev. Rul. 98-8 referred in-
clude a surviving spouse's sale of her qualifying income interest to the
QTIP remainderman and a sale of QTIP Property followed by pay-
ment to the surviving spouse of a portion of the proceeds equal to the
value of her income interest. 2 28 In both cases, the surviving spouse's
connection with the QTIP Property terminates because her income in-
terest is liquidated.2 29 Also in both cases, all that the surviving
223. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 99-08-033.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 131-53.
225. Fuller, Fictions I, supra note 23, at 370.
226. See Rev. Rul. 98-8, 1998-1 C.B. 541.
227. See supra note 204.
228. See id.
229. See Lipoff, Remainder Interests, supra note 187.
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spouse receives in the transaction is the economic value of her income
interest. 230 The surviving spouse in Rev. Rul. 98-8, in contrast, re-
ceived outright ownership of the entire QTIP Property. As a result,
the property's value was includible in her transfer tax base under sec-
tion 2033 and an immediate tax was not necessary to prevent it from
escaping transfer taxes. Rev. Rul. 98-8's transaction can therefore be
distinguished from the examples to which the ruling refers.
In receiving outright ownership of the QTIP Property, the surviv-
ing spouse transferred promissory notes in the value of the QTIP re-
mainder interest. This fact is central to the substance of the
transaction as well as to the Service's second argument, in which it
claimed that even if its first argument failed, the surviving spouse still
made a gift because she did not receive fair and adequate considera-
tion 2 3 1 for the transfer of the promissory notes. The QTIP remainder
interest that she did receive did not constitute fair and adequate con-
sideration because it was already included in her transfer tax base
under section 2044.232 The Service supported this conclusion with a
line of cases holding that a husband's transfer of property in exchange
for his future wife's relinquishment of marital rights was not made for
adequate and full consideration because the assets subject to the mar-
ital rights were already includible in his taxable estate. 2 33 The Ser-
vice argued that the case at hand was analogous since the surviving
spouse had transferred property to the child in exchange for some-
thing that had no effect on the value of her gross estate. 23 4
This argument fails to distinguish between inclusion in the surviv-
ing spouse's estate under section 2044 and outright ownership. The
Service stated: "S's receipt of the remainder interest does not increase
the value of S's taxable estate because that property is already subject
to inclusion in S's taxable estate under [section] 2044."235 But in re-
ceiving the economic and property law rights of outright ownership,
the surviving spouse actually received much more value than what
was already included in her gross estate. This additional value makes
the IRS's reliance on the marital rights cases problematic. In Wemyss,
a taxpayer transferred assets to his fiancee to compensate for her loss
of income under an existing trust that would terminate upon her re-
marriage. 236 The Court held that the transfer was not for "adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth,"237 notwithstand-
230. See infra text accompanying note 232.
231. See supra note 210.
232. See Rev. Rul. 98-8, 1998-1 C.B. 541.
233. See Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945); Comm'r v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 303
(1945).
234. See Rev. Rul. 98-8, 1998-1 C.B. 541.
235. Id.




ing the detriment to his fianc6e, because marriage cannot be reduced
to money value. 238 The Court explained that "to allow detriment to
the donee to satisfy the requirement of 'adequate and full considera-
tion' would violate the purpose of the statute and open wide the door
for evasion of the gift tax."2 39 The Service cited Wemyss for holding
that detriment to the donee does not constitute consideration. But in
Rev. Rul. 98-8, it is not detriment to the remainderman that is satisfy-
ing the adequate and full consideration requirement, but rather the
spouse's receipt of outright ownership, a benefit that is entirely ig-
nored by both of the ruling's arguments.
In a second case cited by the Service, Merrill v. Fahs,240 a taxpayer
created a trust for his fiancee with assets worth $300,000 in exchange
for her waiver of marital rights. The Court held that such a waiver
did not constitute full and adequate consideration because Congress
had provided that under the estate tax, the relinquishment of marital
rights did not constitute full and adequate consideration. The Court
concluded that the gift tax was to be construed in pari materia with
the estate tax.2 4 1
Significantly, a line of cases later distinguished a release of sup-
port rights from a release of marital rights, holding that a release of
support rights can constitute fair and adequate consideration. 2 42
These cases explain that a waiver of support rights grants a proper-
tied spouse a present value that enhances such spouse's gross estate
so that a transfer of an equivalent value, in exchange, does not deplete
the estate. A payment made for such a release represents the "liqui-
dation of a presently existing obligation, the satisfaction of which does
not have the effect of diminishing or depleting the husband's estate to
any greater extent than the payment of other existing legal obliga-
tions."2 43 The waiver or support rights can therefore constitute fair
and adequate consideration. 24 4
Just as a release of support rights is distinguishable from a release
of marital rights because of an immediate benefit to the husband, the
238. See id. at 305.
239. Id. at 307-08.
240. See 324 U.S. 308 (1945).
241. See id. at 313.
242. See Rev. Rul. 68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414 (acknowledging that the relinquishment by
a wife of support rights as contrasted with inheritance rights in an agreement
incident to divorce constitutes consideration in money or money's worth); see also
Estate of Rubin v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 817, 824 (1972); Estate of O'Nan v. Comm'r,
47 T.C. 648, 655 (1967); Estate of Glen v. Comm'r, 45 T.C. 323, 338-42 (1966)
(distinguishing the release of a presently enforceable claim from an actual or
promised relinquishment of dower or curtesy, or a statutory estate created in lieu
of dower, curtesy or other marital rights for purposes of constituting considera-
tion in money or money's worth).
243. Glen, 45 T.C. at 341.
244. See id. at 342.
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case at hand is distinguishable from the marital rights cases because
of an immediate benefit to the surviving spouse. In the marital rights
cases, the property at issue belonged to one spouse and was included
in that spouse's estate. The other spouse had no more than a contin-
gent right with respect to such property. 2 4 5 QTIP Property, in con-
trast, is included in the surviving spouse's estate, but does not belong
to her. When she receives actual ownership, she gains a benefit that
she did not have by virtue of estate inclusion under the Ownership
Fiction.
In Rev. Rul. 98-8, the Service assumed that the surviving spouse
actually enjoyed the property law and economic benefits of full owner-
ship the QTIP Property prior to the transaction. Because she did not,
she gained a very real benefit when her deemed ownership became
actual ownership. Had the Service dropped the fiction and acknowl-
edged this significant benefit, it would have concluded that the surviv-
ing spouse received fair and adequate consideration such that she had
not made a gift.
In contrast, the Service dropped the Ownership Fiction in PLR '033
and acknowledged that a remainderman owns the QTIP remainder
interest for all purposes other than balancing the initial marital de-
duction with a subsequent transfer tax prior to such time as all con-
nections with the marital unit are severed. In ruling that a
remainderman would make a gift to the surviving spouse in the
amount of the QTIP remainder interest if he transferred such interest
without receiving consideration in return, the Service acknowledged
that the remainderman, and not the surviving spouse, enjoyed the
property law and economic rights of ownership of a QTIP remainder
interest.24 6 This correct conclusion conflicts with the incorrect conclu-
sion of Rev. Rul. 98-8 because PLR '033 dropped the Ownership Fic-
tion while Rev. Rul. 98-8 failed to do so.
In producing these inconsistent results, the Service neglected to ac-
knowledge the Ownership Fiction as a conceptual tool, intended to ex-
plain but not to create a given legal result.247 Instead, the Service
used the Ownership Fiction to achieve its desired legal result of taxing
the QTIP remainder interest as soon as possible. In Rev. Rul. 98-8,
this meant using the fiction. In PLR '033, it meant dropping the fic-
tion. Ultimately, this meant using the Ownership Fiction for purposes
other than serving as a metaphor for a truth, thereby facilitating ineq-
uitable results.
245. See Merrill, 324 U.S. at 310.
246. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 99-08-033 (Nov. 30, 1998).
247. Fuller, Fictions III, supra note 23, at 897-99.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has "removed the scaffolding" of the Ownership Fic-
tion from the taxation of QTIP Property. In so doing, it has shown
that when a surviving spouse dies or otherwise disposes of her income
interest, the QTIP Taxing Provisions consistently rely on the Owner-
ship Fiction for purposes of balancing the earlier marital deduction
with a later transfer tax. The resulting taxes are equitable. However,
when a remainderman disposes of a QTIP remainder interest during
the life of the surviving spouse, the QTIP Rulings do not consistently
drop the Ownership Fiction from a situation in which it has no mean-
ing. The results are inconsistent and sometimes incorrect.
In coming to these conclusions, this Article has shed light on the
use of legal fictions in general. The Ownership Fiction should be dis-
tinguished from the taxation of QTIP Property to understand when it
serves as a metaphor for an underlying truth and when it does not. So
too should all legal fictions be distinguished from the legal results that
they facilitate in order to understand their proper use and avoid their
potential dangers.
